

Report to  
The President  
and the Secretary of Defense  
on the  
Department of Defense

BY THE  
BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL

1 July 1970

---

National Command and Control Capability  
and  
Defense Intelligence

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;  
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Sec Def Control No. X-3547



Copy No. 75 of

A-11a

|

BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

July 1, 1970

My dear Mr. President:

It is my honor to submit to you herewith the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel on Command and Control and Defense Intelligence. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the effect its disclosure could have on our national well-being, the Panel asked its subcommittee on Operations to undertake the examination of these two important areas.

Intelligence activities are spread throughout the Department of Defense with little or no effective coordination. There is, as has often been charged, evidence of duplication between the various organizations. Redundancy in intelligence, within reason, is desirable, and it is particularly important that you and other decision-makers have more than one independent source of intelligence. We feel, however, that there is a large

TS 55-909


imbalance in the allocation of resources, which causes more information to be collected than can ever be processed and used.

Furthermore, there is a tendency within the intelligence community to produce intelligence for the intelligence community and to remain remote from and not give sufficient attention to the requirements of others who have valid needs for intelligence. The basic objective of the intelligence community should be to get the right information to the right people at the right time.

I hope the Panel's recommendations will not be considered criticisms of individuals, but will help to solve the problems associated with Command and Control and Intelligence in a way that effectively supports the objectives of the Department of Defense and the Nation:

I know my colleagues on the Panel join me in expressing to you our appreciation for giving us the privilege of undertaking this important assignment at this critical period in our Nation's history.

Respectfully yours,



GILBERT W. FITZHUGH  
Chairman

The President  
The White House

## THE PANEL

Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman  
Chairman of Board, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Dr. Martha E. Peterson\*\*\*  
President, Barnard College  
Columbia University

John M. Fluke  
President, John Fluke  
Manufacturing Co., Inc.

Wilfred J. McNeil  
Dir.-Advisor Fairchild  
Hiller Corp., Pres.,  
Tax Foundation

Mrs. Leona P. Thurman  
Attorney-at-Law

Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger\*\*  
Professor of Physics  
Princeton University

Dr. Ruben F. Mettler\*  
President, TRW, Inc.

William Blackie  
Chairman of Board  
Caterpillar Tractor Co.

Robert C. Jackson\*  
Chairman  
Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.\*  
Attorney-at-Law

George Champion  
President of Economic  
Development Board of NYC

Lane Kirkland  
Secretary-Treasurer AFL-CIO

Dr. George J. Stigler  
Professor of American  
Institutions, Univ.  
of Chicago

William P. Clements, Jr.  
Chairman of Board, SEDCO, Inc.

Hobart D. Lewis  
President, Readers Digest  
Association, Inc.

Claude Young  
Office of Commissioner  
Professional Football

\*Members of the Operations Subcommittee.

\*\*Found it necessary to terminate his services on the Panel due to illness.

\*\*\*Found it necessary to terminate her services on the Panel due to press  
of duties as President of Barnard College.

## THE STAFF

J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr.

William G. Howard

Major Richard T. Baer, USAF

Mary E. McCausland

## PREFACE

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was appointed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in July 1969, and given the following broad Charter, with instructions to submit its Final Report by July 1, 1970:

The general scope of the Panel is to study, report and make recommendations on:

(1) The organization and management of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Agencies and the military services, as it affects the Department's mission performance, decision-making process, the command and control function and facilities, and the coordination with other governmental departments and agencies, with emphasis on the responsiveness to the requirements of the President and the Secretary of Defense.

(2) The Defense research and development efforts from the standpoints of mission fulfillments, costs, organization, time and interrelation with the scientific and industrial community.

(3) The Defense procurement policies and practices, particularly as they relate to costs, time and quality.

(4) Such other matters as the Secretary may submit to it from time to time.

It is important to note that, while the Charter is very broad as to the Panel's function in the fields of structure, organization, and operating procedures of the entire Department of Defense, it excludes considerations of broad national policy. The Panel has endeavored to hew closely to this line.

We were told that this is the first broad-scale study of the Department of Defense in many years -- in fact since the two Commissions on Organization of the Executive Department of the Government chaired by former President Herbert Hoover.

We decided to approach our assignment with the same broad objectives as stated in the Hoover Commission Report, namely:

(1) That the primary objectives of the National Security Organization is to preserve the peace, but that it must at all times be ready and able, promptly and effectively, to marshall all of our resources, human and material, for the protection of our national security.

(2) That civilian influence must be dominant in the formulation of national policy and that civilian control of the military establishment must be clearly established and firmly maintained.

(3) That the Nation is entitled to the maximum possible return for every dollar of military expenditure.

(4) That military efficiency -- in other words, readiness for war -- must be the fundamental objective of the National Military Establishment.

(5) That elimination of wasteful duplication is essential to good government, but that the preservation, within sound limits, of a healthy competitive spirit and of service pride and tradition are basic to progress and morale.

Because of the vast scope of the operations of the Department of Defense, the Panel divided itself into four sub-committees, as follows:

(1) Organization and Personnel Management.

(2) Management of Materiel Resources (including research, development, procurement and management of weapons and supplies) planning, programming, budgeting, and similar procedures.

(3) Military operations, intelligence, communications, automatic data processing.

(4) Conflicts of interests, contract compliance, domestic action, equal employment opportunity, etc.

The Panel interviewed many witnesses in depth, and the sub-committees many more. It made a functional survey of the Defense headquarters organizations in the Washington area covering some 1,600 organizational elements to elicit information on the actual operation of and interface between units of the Department of Defense. It also sent a questionnaire to a large number of people outside the Department of Defense who we thought might wish to give us the benefit of their thinking. We enjoyed a remarkable response, with answers ranging from a page to dozens of pages of detailed suggestions.

The Panel members and the staff carefully reviewed many earlier reports of studies of the Department of Defense, and many visits were made to important elements of the Department outside the Washington area. Members representing sub-committees Three and Four visited a number of military Commands in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia, to see how policies determined at Washington Headquarters were carried out in the operational units.

Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the effect its disclosure could have on the national well-being, the Panel asked sub-committee Three to undertake an examination of the areas of National Command and Control and Defense intelligence and make a classified report.

The Panel wishes to extend its deep appreciation to the many people in the Department of Defense -- both military and civilian -- who contributed generously of their time in answering its innumerable questions and volunteering so many constructive suggestions. We found them uniformly anxious to help and enthusiastic about the possibilities for improving operations. We realize that this would not have happened without the strong support of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard.

To all these people who contributed so much to its endeavors, the Panel extends its deep thanks.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|  | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------|
| PREFACE                                | i           |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                      | 1           |
| COMMAND AND CONTROL                    | 9           |
| Introduction                           | 9           |
| Warning Time                           | 10          |
| Presidential Survival                  | 11          |
| The Military Command Centers           | 13          |
| Communications                         | 15          |
| Strategic Decisions                    | 16          |
| Strategic Launches                     | 17          |
| Strategic Defense                      | 19          |
| RECOMMENDATIONS                        | 19          |
| DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE                   | 21          |
| The Intelligence Community             | 21          |
| The Defense Intelligence Community     | 23          |
| The Office of the Secretary of Defense | 23          |
| The Cryptologic Community              | 25          |
| General Defense Intelligence           | 29          |
| The Defense Intelligence Agency        | 30          |
| The Intelligence Process               | 32          |
| Requirements                           | 32          |
| Collection                             | 34          |
| Processing                             | 37          |
| Production                             | 37          |
| Dissemination                          | 40          |
| Evaluation                             | 41          |
| Special Programs                       | 41          |
| Tactical Intelligence                  | 42          |
| Compartmented Intelligence             | 44          |
| RECOMMENDATIONS                        | 46          |

BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL REPORT ON  
NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL  
AND DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This summary provides a brief review of the report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel resulting from its examination of National Command and Control capability and the Defense Intelligence Community.

With regard to intelligence, we find that:

X The intelligence effort of the Department of Defense is a part of a coordinated national effort, and represents roughly [ ] the national intelligence resources. However, responsibility for the management of Defense intelligence is fragmented between many elements of the Department and is neither well coordinated nor adequately directed toward satisfying proven consumer needs.

- There does not appear to be an effective mechanism for potential users of intelligence, either at National level or internal to the Department of Defense, to express their needs. The Defense intelligence community appears to function largely in response to requirements generated within the intelligence community.

- There is no effective mechanism to effect a proper balance in the allocation of resources between the various intelligence functions. The present production resources can make use of only a fraction of the information that is collected.

- There is no effective mechanism for the allocation of collection resources to assure that needed information is collected in the most economical manner, consistent with the urgency of the need.

- There is no substantial effort or procedure to evaluate the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. It is not possible, today, to obtain an objective assessment of the validity of the requirements which drive the process, the efficiency and effectiveness of the collection and production functions nor the value and utility of the substantive output.

- Personnel security investigations are performed by the investigative elements of the Military Departments. The regulations of each of the Military Departments make reference to accepting the validity of previous investigations completed by any agency of the Federal Government which meet the minimum investigative requirements of that particular Department. For all practical purposes, the Departments interpret this narrowly and usually do not accept the investigations of another Department as meeting their standards.

- Each Military Department has a large organization devoted primarily to Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) activities. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) attempts to coordinate these activities to eliminate duplication and set priorities for production. However, DIA coordinates through the intelligence elements of the Departmental staffs, and only the Air Force MC&G agency is within the purview of the intelligence staff. The Army and Navy MC&G agencies are not a part of the intelligence community.

- There is no substantial corps of professional intelligence officers in the Military Services, nor a professional intelligence career service for civilians in the general Defense intelligence community. The National Security Agency secured special legislation which permits the employment of career analysts with compensation equivalent to Grade 16, 17, and 18 levels. The Director also has the authority to assign and reassign civilian personnel to the position and geographic location where their talents can be best used.

The Panel recommends that the Defense intelligence community be restructured to provide a better management structure and to assure the provision of intelligence, as required, to the President other consumers at the national level and to all levels of the Department from the Secretary of Defense to operating units in the field. The new intelligence structure should:

1. Function in response to consumer requirements for intelligence and provide timely and quality products, responsive to those requirements, with a proper balance between collection, processing, and production activities.

2. Provide a clear chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the collection and production units that will assure the timely flow of intelligence information and minimize the injection of bias arising from Service affiliations, or operational location.

3. Provide for a single individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who is the clearly designated representative of the Secretary of Defense to other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and who is responsible to coordinate or direct all intelligence activities within the Department.

4. Provide flexibility for timely development and distribution of limited, costly resources, both trained personnel and equipments, to meet changing priorities.

5. Provide the proper environment to develop an effective and efficient professional intelligence career service for both military and civilian personnel.

Specifically, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

1. Designate the Deputy Secretary for Operations to be his agent for all matters relating to intelligence, to include the authority to designate those activities to be considered intelligence activities.

2. Establish under the Deputy Secretary for Operations an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)), with the additional title of Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI). The ASD(I)/DDI would be delegated the responsibility to represent the Secretary of Defense with other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and to coordinate or direct all DOD intelligence activities, including national programs which are managed in the Department, in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Among his specific responsibilities, the ASD(I)/DDI would:

a. Serve as the Defense representative on the United States Intelligence Board, and appoint, with approval of the Deputy Secretary for Operations, representatives to other government-wide intelligence committees and boards.

b. Direct and control all DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces.

c. Have the authority to delegate operation of any of these activities which he deems necessary to assure maximum exploitation of DOD resources.

d. Review all proposed intelligence programs, monitor and evaluate all on-going intelligence activities and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for Operations with regard to allocation of resources.

e. Establish procedures to review and validate requirements for intelligence production and collection and evaluate the product against the requirement.

f. Establish procedures for and periodically conduct a systematic evaluation of the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. This evaluation should include an assessment of the utility of the intelligence products provided to consumers outside the Defense intelligence community.

g. Review and consolidate requirements for research and development in support of intelligence activities.

h. Develop policies and procedures to insure the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

3. Establish under the ASD(I)/DDI:

a. A Defense Security Command (DSECC) to be composed of the present Service Cryptologic Agencies and all other Defense intelligence collection activities except for those which have been specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces. The DSECC should perform those processing activities which are most efficiently associated with collection facilities. Among his specific responsibilities, the Commander, DSECC would, under the direction of the DDI:

(1) Command all those designated Defense intelligence collection and associated processing and reporting activities, with authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Serve as Director, National Security Agency.

(3). Insure the most judicious use of common staff elements between his DSECC and NSA.

(4) Insure the timely dissemination of intelligence information to all appropriate Departments, Agencies, Commands or operating units.

(5) Prepare the Defense Security Program for those activities for which he is responsible, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence collection activities organic to the combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

b. A Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), to replace the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose Director would be responsible for Defense Intelligence production except for those production activities specifically assigned to the combatant forces by the Deputy Secretary for Operations. Among his specific responsibilities, the Director, DIPA would:

(1) Direct those intelligence production activities which have been placed under his purview, with the authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Provide current intelligence to designated individuals and organizations.

(3) Provide threat assessments for all elements of DOD, as required.

(4) Provide finished intelligence to appropriate elements of the Department in response to expressed needs.

(5) Provide all DOD intelligence estimates and inputs to national estimates as directed by the DDI.

(6) Manage all Defense intelligence production information systems, including those of the intelligence activities organic to the combatant forces, to insure inter-operability and optimized intelligence flow to and from all echelons of DOD.

(7) Prepare the Defense Intelligence Program for those activities under his direction, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence production activities organic to combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

4. Expand the responsibilities of the National Security Agency to include the processing, data base maintenance and reporting of all intelligence information as directed by the DDI.

5. Establish within the DSECC a unified Defense Investigative Service responsible for all personnel security investigations within the DOD and its contractors.

6. Combine the Army Topographic Command, the Naval Oceanographic Office and the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center into a unified Defense Map Service reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Management of Resources).

7. Take the actions necessary (a) to extend to the entire Defense intelligence community the authority that the National Security Agency presently has to develop a professional career service, and (b) to establish an intelligence career service for military officers.

Page 9-20  
done

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

### A. Introduction

## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

### I. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The National "intelligence community" consists of the Departments and Agencies of the Government which are responsible for the collection of information and production of foreign intelligence essential to the security of the United States. The principal departments and agencies of the intelligence community are the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is essential that the activities of these departments and agencies be closely coordinated to assure efficient and effective operation.

The DCI is responsible for the general management and coordination of the intelligence community, in addition to serving as the Director of CIA.

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is the formal instrument established by the National Security Council (NSC) to advise and assist the DCI, as he requires, in discharging his statutory responsibilities. The responsibilities and functions of the USIB are set forth in National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1. Its primary responsibility is to achieve an effectively coordinated intelligence community in the interest of National Security.

The major functions assigned in NSCID No. 1 are:

1. To establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned.
2. To establish appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities.
3. To review the national intelligence effort and report to the NSC on its adequacy, integration and gaps identified

4. To make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters to appropriate government officials, including particularly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director, NSA.

5. To develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

6. To formulate, as required, policies in regard to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

The functions of USIB are performed through its 14 committees and sub-committees. Most of the Chairmen of the USIB committees and sub-committees are representatives of the DCI, provided from the National Intelligence Program Evaluation Staff, which supports him.

The Department of Defense is represented on the USIB by the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). When DIA was established its Director replaced the senior intelligence officers of the three military departments on the USIB; however, they are permitted to participate in board meetings as observers and to add footnotes to USIB papers stating their points of disagreement. The military departments still retain full membership on the committees and sub-committees of the USIB. There is little or no coordination among the Defense representatives and observers on the USIB and they often appear to be working at cross purposes.

Intelligence requirements at the national level are determined in the USIB entirely by representatives of the intelligence community. It is not clear that consumers of intelligence outside the intelligence community make a significant contribution to this process.

The Board of National Estimates (BNE) is composed of a number of distinguished men, appointed by the DCI, from industry, the academic community and the professions. The BNE periodically submits to USIB a program of proposed production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) for approval. Upon approval, terms of reference for each estimate are prepared and contributions are obtained from the member agencies of the USIB. The BNE completes its evaluation and submits a first draft for coordination with the member agencies. After revision, the estimate is submitted

to the USIB for approval. If any member of the USIB or any of the senior intelligence officers of the Services disagree with the estimate, the dissenting opinions are published as integral parts of the estimate. The value of the estimate process is often destroyed in the coordination - revision cycle as watered-down compromises are accepted rather than establishing the basic document, and then adding the disagreements.

The National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) was recently established to advise the DCI on needs for intelligence resources to support the U.S. foreign intelligence effort. The members of the NIRB are the Deputy, DCI, Chairman; the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.

## II. THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Defense Intelligence effort is normally programmed in two major packages: The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), with the Director, NSA designated Program Manager; and The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), with the Director, DIA designated Program Manager. While the Director, NSA and Director, DIA are designated Program Managers they do not in fact manage the Defense intelligence effort. The responsibility for management of the effort is fragmented within and between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Military Departments. The Program Managers consolidate the submissions of all participants in the program, but do not have control of the budget. Once money to support the approved program is allocated to the Services, they may or may not use it for its intended purposes.

From time to time special programs are established to develop some new intelligence resource or capability. In such cases a program manager is designated by the Secretary of Defense and the program becomes a part of the intelligence community.

### A. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

Currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (ASD(A)) is clearly the senior official in the Defense organization for managing the intelligence effort. On August 1, 1969, the Secretary of Defense assigned "additional responsibilities for intelligence" to the ASD(A) and stated:

"In discharging these responsibilities, I fully expect the ASD(A) to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense intelligence community. In order to accomplish this improvement, he is charged with the following responsibilities:

1. To establish an intelligence resource review and decision-making process which will comprise:

a. A mechanism for making comparisons and appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence activities and programs so that DOD decision makers can select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing, producing and disseminating intelligence.

b. A Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan.

c. A procedure for identifying and surfacing major issues of intelligence resource allocation and management.

d. A continuing system for review of intelligence collection requirements balanced against collection resource

2. To improve intelligence communications among DOD agencies and between the Department of Defense and other agencies.

3. To evaluate intelligence organizational relationships, roles and missions.

4. To review security policies and eliminate unnecessary classification and compartmentations."

The ASD(A) has limited his purview, initially, to resource allocation and has established a review process wherein each Program Manager is responsible for resource management within his program. Procedures are worked out whereby each Program Manager conducts his review and then reports to the ASD(A). The ASD(A) then performs a review across all the programs to identify areas where there is a possibility of duplication or inefficiency.

The ASD(A) has adopted the Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS) as a management tool to assist in his cross-program review.

It is not possible to make valid judgments on the proper allocation of a collection resource to a target without considering why, and with what urgency, the information is required and balancing that against the degree to which the information collected by the resource satisfies the requirement.

There is a real need to make comparisons and trade-offs between the major intelligence activities and programs to select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence. Resources should be allocated to attain a balance in the capability to collect, process and produce intelligence. It appears at present that collection capabilities far exceed the capabilities to process and produce.

#### B. The Cryptologic Community

The organizations involved in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) effort are referred to collectively as the Cryptologic Community. This community consists of the National Security Agency (NSA), at its head, and the service cryptologic agencies (SCAs). Also holding membership in this community, though not generally included in the term, is the SIGINT Committee, with its sub-committees, of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

The current authority for organization and operation of this community is the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6, effective 15 September 1958, and revised 18 January 1961. This document provides the national policy for Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), collectively referred to as SIGINT. It defines the responsibilities of the USIB, Secretary of Defense, NSA, Director NSA, DCI and Military Departments.

P 26427  
direct

The fundamental community, NSA and the SCAs, can be described as a two-part system. NSA is the part providing the system management, through operational and technical control, processing of the raw SIGINT data and disseminating the processed SIGINT information to the consumers. The SCAs are basically the collection portion of the system.

TOP SECRET

NSA has statutory authority to develop a professional career service for its civilian employees. DIRNSA has the authority to recruit, train, assign and promote the civilian employees of NSA. He can prescribe as a condition of employment that NSA employees must serve any place in the world as the needs of the Agency dictate. In addition, he has authority to establish professional positions, primarily in research and development, at the basic compensation equal to rates of basic compensation authorized for Grades 16, 17 and 18 of the General Schedule.

### C. General Defense Intelligence

General defense intelligence encompasses the intelligence activities, other than cryptologic, performed by elements of the Department of Defense, primarily the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Military Services. The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) is the management tool used to program and manage the general defense intelligence effort. The Director, DIA is designated Program Manager and consolidates the submissions of the Military Departments.

There is no substantial corps of professional intelligence officers in the Military Services and no professional intelligence career service for civilians in the general defense intelligence community. There are no incentives for a military officer to become an intelligence specialist, with the result that military billets in the intelligence community are filled by a succession of transient generalists. Civilians become intelligence specialists largely on the basis of longevity only. The present Defense intelligence community with its fragmented responsibilities does not provide an environment in which a professional career intelligence service can be developed.

DIA was established in 1961 in an effort to create a mechanism to solve the problems presented by the disparate intelligence estimates being produced and duplicative efforts being engaged in by the Military Departments.

DIA is assigned the responsibility for:

1. The organization, direction, management, and control of all DOD intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA.
2. Review and coordination of those intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the Military Departments.
3. Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA.
4. Obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Defense intelligence resources.
5. Responding directly to priority requests levied upon the DIA by the United States Intelligence Board.
6. Satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense.

Its charter reveals that DIA was originally intended to (1) provide for the assembly, integration and validation of all Defense intelligence requirements, the policies and procedures for collection, and the assignment of relative priorities to the requirements, and (2) develop and produce all finished intelligence for the Department of Defense. It was intended that the Military Departments would retain the resources to collect and process intelligence information, under the supervision of DIA.

Concurrent with the establishment of DIA, the Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) of the Joint Staff was disestablished and its functions assigned to the Director of DIA. The established reporting line for DIA was and is through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

The principal problems of DIA can be summarized as too many jobs and too many masters.

Two areas of conflict are apparent. In addition to his administrative responsibilities as the Director of a Defense Agency, the Director of DIA must provide the staff assistance on intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and must also provide the staff assistance on intelligence matters to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On many intelligence issues, particularly procedural issues with jurisdictional implications, the positions of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be and often are diverse. As staff officer and advisor to both, the Director of DIA finds himself in an impossible position. The result can be delays in staff work that in turn result in unresolved issues of significant moment.

The second area of conflict is between DIA and the Military Services. The Director, DIA is charged with preparing the GDIP and with responsibility to supervise the collection and processing of intelligence by the Military Services, specifically by prescribing procedures, validating requirements, assigning collection and production tasks, and reviewing the total intelligence programs of the Services. Yet, the Director of DIA reports directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprised in four-fifths majority by the Senior Officers of the four Military Services for whose intelligence programs the Director of DIA is charged with the responsibility to provide coordinated supervision. In addition, the Services determine which officers of what qualification are assigned to DIA, and they retain the power of promotion and future assignment over those so assigned. In consequence, the "supervision" by DIA of intelligence collection and processing by the Services and its fiscal control and coordination of the Service intelligence programs are largely impotent.

The Military Departments are charged with organizing, training and equipping intelligence forces for assignment to combatant commands, and to conduct those intelligence functions which peculiarly relate to departmental missions, including the development and support of intelligence systems organic to combatant forces. In addition, each department has retained the responsibility to manage and operate certain types of intelligence activities, including counter-intelligence and investigative services, scientific and technical intelligence, mapping, charting and geodesy as well as their respective cryptologic agencies.

While the DIA was established primarily to consolidate the intelligence activities at Washington level, each Military Department currently has a larger intelligence staff than it had before the creation of DIA. Each departmental staff is still engaged in

activities clearly assigned to DIA such as intelligence production including the preparation of current intelligence. The Military Departments justify these activities on the basis that DIA does not have the capability to provide the intelligence they need. It is interesting that DIA cannot develop a capability to perform its assigned functions, while the Military Departments, which provide a large proportion of DIA personnel, maintain the required capability and continue to perform the functions. A case in point is the capability to produce intelligence estimates, (or more properly, threat assessments), which are crucial to decisions on weapons systems research and development. DIA is charged with the responsibility, but has never been structured to discharge it. The Military Departments produce such estimates, and the Air Force, at least, intends to enlarge its capability.

## 1. The Intelligence Process

The intelligence process can generally be considered as consisting of five functions: requirements, collection, processing, production and dissemination. There is now no effective mechanism to effect a proper balance in the allocation of resources between these various functions. There is some evidence that much more information is being collected than can be processed, and unquestionably, more can be processed than can be used in production.

### a. Requirements

In March 1962, shortly after the establishment of DIA, the JCS issued to DIA a memorandum, entitled: "Actions to Strengthen the Intelligence Capabilities of the Unified and Specified Commands," and concomitantly, a memorandum to the Commanders of each Unified and Specified Commands, entitled: "Authority to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities of Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands." These memoranda directed that intelligence staffs and attendant intelligence activities be established. Specifically, an Intelligence Requirements/Collection Office was directed to be established at each Unified and Specified Command Headquarters which would perform functions compatible with the requirements and collection functions of DIA. DIA was directed to issue guidance as to policies, procedures, format and priorities of intelligence requirements to achieve standardization of requirements processing throughout DOD. Requirements flow would follow command channels to DIA for validation and for levy. This action was the basis for establishing layers of

review. In a message of March 1962, from the JCS to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands, that body clearly pointed out that the channel for requirements is between DIA, acting for the JCS, and the Unified and Specified Commanders; and in turn from the Unified and Specified Commanders to their components. The original intent of these actions was to take the staffs and activities from the component commands and move them one echelon higher, but this did not happen, since the Military Department Headquarters were still authorized direct access to the component commands.

Throughout the 1960s, the various intelligence elements of the Military Departments complained about the inordinate time it takes for a requirement to be validated by DIA. The complaints are well-founded. The various layers of review consume time; the mere courier forwarding and administrative handling within each organization adds to the delay. Additionally, DIA was given the responsibility to insure that requirements were not duplicative, that sufficient research was to be done to establish that the information was not in existence within the files of DIA, or other intelligence files within the intelligence community, prior to levying a specific collection requirement. If the requirement had to be levied on a national agency, up to six months might pass before DIA was notified of the acceptance of that requirement by that national agency. This time span has now been reduced to an average of about one month.

Another problem has existed concerning the handling of collection requirements for scientific and technical intelligence. When DIA was given the responsibility for management of scientific and technical intelligence, a specific Assistant Directorship was established and the Directorate took as its charter the DOD Directive 5105.28, which included the responsibility for the assembly, integration, validation, and assignment of priorities for all Defense technical intelligence collection and production requirements. The result was a conflict between the Assistant Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence and the Assistant Director for Collection, from the chiefs down through the action officers. This reinforced the accusation that the requirements validation process was unreasonably slow, and that it was difficult to know to whom to direct requirements, questions, and/or correspondence concerning those requirements.

The requirements process is slow, cumbersome and unwieldy. It functions almost entirely within the intelligence community and is fraught with an unyielding sense of sovereignty

at every level. There does not appear to be an effective mechanism for potential users of intelligence to express their needs. The intelligence community must accept its responsibility to function in response to valid consumer requirements and develop procedures to permit such requirements to be expressed. It is clear that the authority and capability to coordinate intelligence requirements, establish relative priorities, and assign collection and production tasks to the proper organizations, is the key to efficient and effective management of the intelligence process.

#### b. Collection

The Military Departments own, manage and operate almost all general Defense intelligence collection resources except the Defense Attaches, who are assigned from the Services and managed by DIA. The Departments have developed different organizational structures for controlling intelligence collection; however, they have two very important points in common: the senior intelligence officer of the Departmental Headquarters has some degree of operational control; and the intelligence units are structured in a common chain separate from the operational command structure.

The Army has established the U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) to discharge some of the Army's intelligence responsibilities including all collection, other than that performed by the Army Security Agency. While USAINTC is a major command reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, maintains direct operational control of some of its more sensitive elements.

The Navy has all of its general defense intelligence resources in the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC). The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) is also the Commander, NIC.

The Air Force has retained the control of non-technical sensor intelligence collection in the Departmental Staff. A world-wide human collection effort is controlled by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, while all the resources for counterintelligence and investigations are assigned to the Inspector General.

There is no effective mechanism for the allocation of collection resources to assure that needed information is collected in the most economical manner, consistent with the urgency of the need.

The Defense Atomic Support Agency is the only Defense Agency, other than DIA, with a stated intelligence mission, with the responsibility for the counter-intelligence and security mission associated with the physical security of nuclear weapons.

### (1) Personnel Security Investigations

Personnel security investigations are a particular type of collection performed by the investigative elements of the Military Departments: The Army Intelligence Command; the Air Force Office of Special Investigations; and the Naval Investigative Service. All background investigations are controlled by these organizations at headquarters level. They perform the background investigations for all military and civilian personnel of their respective departments and a pro rata share of civilians assigned to the various agencies and elements of the Department of Defense not in one of the Military Departments. They participate by quota in industrial security background investigations.

The purpose of a personnel security investigation is to establish that the individual is responsible, loyal and trustworthy. These investigations can generally be considered in three categories:

a. A National Agency Check (NAC) is required for granting access to SECRET defense information. In addition, a final TOP SECRET clearance may be granted to Air Force and Navy military personnel based upon an NAC which has been made any time during the previous 15 years, provided that the individual has been in continuous government service or on active duty during the past 15 years with no break in service in excess of six months. An NAC includes a check of the criminal and subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, as appropriate, the files of the Military Departments, the Civil Service Commission, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the House Internal Security Committee and others.

b. A Background Investigation (BI) is required for granting a TOP SECRET clearance to Defense Department civilians, Army personnel on active duty and Navy and Air Force personnel who do not meet the criteria in a above. A BI is a "thorough inquiry" covering the individual's life during

the last 15 years or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter. It includes verification of date and place of birth, citizenship, education, employment, military service, foreign travel, foreign connections, character references, and a National Agency Check.

c. An Expanded Background Investigation (EBI) is a prerequisite to granting access to special intelligence, compartmented intelligence and for assignment to an Ultra Sensitive Position. Only U.S. citizens are eligible for these accesses, and reinvestigation is mandatory at least every five years. An EBI includes an NAC, not over 12 months old, and a BI. In addition, the individual's immediate family, including spouse and former spouse(s) are checked with FBI files. Passport Office and CIA files are checked if the individual has traveled outside the US for pleasure or for non-US Government-sponsored trips. Verification of citizenship is made on members of the individual's immediate family. A credit check is made on the individual at each place of residence of more than six months. Neighborhood investigations are conducted to verify the current residence and at each of the former residences where the individual resided for six months or more. Court records are reviewed if the individual was divorced or legally separated to ascertain any financial obligations prescribed by the courts.

In addition to the differing requirements of the Military Departments for granting security clearances as indicated above, there are variations in the manner in which the investigations are done. For instance, all Departments require an NAC as a part of a BI. The Army and Navy require an NAC without reference to previous NACs. The Air Force will accept an NAC if it is less than two years old. Army and Navy neighborhood investigations and credit record reviews are conducted "when deemed necessary" to prove or disprove derogatory information. Air Force regulations do not mention neighborhood investigations nor credit record reviews. The Army requires a check of court records if the individual is divorced. Navy and Air Force do not require this check.

The Army and Air Force grant access to cryptographic materials based on a BI, while the Navy requires an EBI.

The regulations of each of the Military Departments make reference to accepting the validity of previous investigations completed by any agency of the Federal Government which meet the minimum investigative requirements of that particular Department. For all practical purposes, the Departments interpret this narrowly and usually do not accept the investigations of another Department as meeting their standards.

#### c. Processing

Most raw intelligence information must be processed in some way to put it in a form suitable for use by a production analyst. Each type of information requires its own processing; e.g., captured documents are translated or SIGINT is processed by NSA.

The Director, Central Intelligence (DCI) provides as a service of common interest within the community the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) (C). The Director, NPIC (C), is appointed by the DCI and the member departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board furnish personnel and support as required.]

#### d. Production

The intelligence production activities of the DOD can be classified into four major groups: Current Intelligence; Scientific and Technical Intelligence; Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G), and general intelligence production.

The March 1962 memoranda from the JCS to DIA and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands mentioned previously also directed that the Unified and Specified Commands establish and/or operate activities, except for activities under Service cryptologic agencies, to perform intelligence functions of common interest. This was amplified and specified in July 1962 by JCS memorandum to establish a current intelligence/indications function; intelligence production including estimates function; and target intelligence function.

It should be noted at this point that the Military Departments had not yet transferred to DIA their intelligence production elements. That was done in January, February and March 1963.

The assignment of intelligence production mission to the Unified and Specified Commands directly contradicted the function spelled out in the DOD Directive 5105.21 which established DIA, that DIA would "develop, produce, and provide all Defense finished intelligence and supporting data, including area analysis, military capabilities, biographic data summaries, target intelligence, and related publications for the use of all DOD components...." The JCS further had charged DIA with ensuring that there would be no duplication in the production of intelligence.

By 1966, DIA acknowledged the realities of the situation by issuing the Defense Intelligence Plan which had been extensively coordinated with the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands. The purpose of the Plan was to provide the basis for integrated planning, programming and management of Defense intelligence. It delineated the intelligence responsibilities and relationships of Department of Defense components and instituted a Department-wide system for review and analysis of intelligence operations to facilitate mutual support and eliminate wasteful duplication. One of the principles which this Plan spelled out was that "intelligence produced at higher echelons must be supplemented by local production at lower echelons in order to satisfy particular command requirements." The Plan further acknowledged that "some degree of parallel and overlapping effort is normal and necessary." The primary role of DIA thus shifted from the production of all Defense intelligence to the production of some strategic or that intelligence used at the JCS/OSD/national level. The members of the JCS, as chiefs of service, still maintain current intelligence and estimates capabilities on their respective staffs to support their positions vis-a-vis those of DIA.

It should be borne in mind that these actions were the result of extensive negotiations with the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands including component commands. DIA has no directive authority over military intelligence activities, but only review, coordination, supervisor and a nebulous management authority. But more and more, DIA has been pushed into a management role by those very elements which maintain that DIA is incapable of producing intelligence to meet their needs.

Each of the Military Departments has continued to strengthen the capability of its staff to produce general and current intelligence and to supervise the production of S&T intelligence and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) activities.

Each Department has a large organization devoted primarily to MC&G activities: The Army Topographic Command of the Corps of Engineers; The Naval Oceanographic Office under the Oceanographer of the Navy; and The Aeronautical Chart and Information Center reporting to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

DIA attempts to coordinate these activities to eliminate duplication and set priorities for production. However, DIA coordinates through the intelligence elements of the Departmental staffs, and only in the Air Force is the MC&G agency within the staff purview of the intelligence staff. The Army and Navy MC&G elements are in agencies which are not a part of the intelligence community.

There appears to be great potential for savings of personnel and expensive equipment by consolidating these three agencies into one Defense Map Service with a single command staff.

Each of the Military Departments produces S&T intelligence. The Army has two S&T production agencies; both subordinate to the Army Materiel Command: The Foreign Science and Technology Center reporting to the staff of the Army Materiel Command Headquarters; and the Missile Intelligence Directorate, an element of the Army Missile Command. The Air Force S&T intelligence production agency is the Foreign Technology Division of the Air Force Systems Command. The Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center is an element of the NIC.

Both the Army and Air Force agencies are an integral part of the research and development community and their efforts are substantially augmented from research and development funds.

DIA has tasking authority over each of the Centers and assigns the specific production tasks to be accomplished with a specified scope and format. The large majority of the requirements for S&T intelligence production arise in the research and

development laboratories of the Services. DIA reviews the individual requirements and generalizes them so that many requirements will be satisfied by one general product. The format and scope of the product is aimed primarily at the Departmental or major command staff planners. As a consequence, it appears that S&T intelligence products do not satisfy the requirements of the scientists in the research and development laboratories, have no relevance to the managers at OSD level, and are generally not used by Departmental and major command staff planners.

Threat assessments are a type of intelligence product that are based on S&T intelligence but are usually prepared by an agency other than an S&T intelligence producer. Any recommendation or decision to develop or produce a weapon or weapons system should include consideration of the enemy threat in the time period when the weapons or weapons systems will be operational. Such recommendations and decisions are made in the Services and OSD.

The general defense intelligence community has not yet succeeded in producing threat assessments which are accepted by the research and development community, largely because each Service tends to see the threat that will advance the weapons or systems it owns or proposes. There are, of course, many instances, such as the so-called "missile gap" of 1960, where an intelligence threat assessment has been used to bring about major weapons decisions.

DDR&E has established his own group to prepare threat assessments for use at the OSD level.

There is always a danger that intelligence will be misused when an organization prepares the intelligence assessments that provide a basis for its operating decisions.

#### e. Dissemination

The DIA, on a daily basis, disseminates reports to elements of the DOD intelligence community based on requests from the individual elements. Dissemination of a general nature is based on statements of intelligence needs compiled by the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands. Bulk copies are shipped to the Military Departments who further disseminate them to their subordinate elements and component commands of the Unified Commands. For those products not produced by DIA, dissemination lists are compiled by DIA and furnished to the producing organization for direct dissemination.

## F. Evaluation

There is one other function which should be associated with the intelligence process: evaluation. Discussions with users and potential users of intelligence seem to indicate that only a small proportion of the intelligence produced is useful. Many individuals who are familiar with the Defense intelligence community are critical of its operation. Responsible witnesses have told our sub-committee that:

(1) The Defense intelligence community does not have an effective mechanism for accomplishing the selective validation of requirements for intelligence collection or production;

(2) More intelligence information is collected than can ever be processed or used, much of it is collected because the sensor represents an advance in technology without regard to the need for the information;

(3) The human collection activities of the Services add little or nothing to the national capability;

(4) Defense attaches do more harm than good;

(5) The intelligence production analysts are not competent to produce a sound, useful product; and

(6) Once produced, the product seldom reaches the individuals who need it.

None of these allegations can be either proved or disproved today, because there is no substantial effort or procedure to systematically evaluate the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community or its substantive output.

## D. Special Programs

From time to time, special programs are established to manage the development of some new collection resource or capability. Such developments are usually expensive and involve some degree of cooperation with some other agency of Government. A program of this type is often designated as a "National Program" and the Secretary of Defense is designated Executive Agent for the Government. As a consequence, the responsibility for such a program tends to be placed at a relatively high level in the

Headquarters of one of the Military Departments. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has established a committee to review such programs and advise him with regard to the allocation of funds to them. Some program managers attempt to use the existence of this committee and the "National" designation of the program to avoid reporting to the ASD(A). Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the head of the cooperating agency sees any ambiguity in the reporting lines, but many manhours are wasted in debate and the task of the Secretary's senior representative is made more difficult. Another effect of this type of parochial tactic is that it establishes a fiction that permeates the entire staff of the program. In one particular program which was surveyed for the Panel, the Program staff was either ignorant of their responsibilities and relationships in the community or deliberately misleading in their statements.

A different type of problem also exists with programs of this sort. Since they are predominantly concerned with the development of a new capability, the management of the program is usually assigned to a development agency. This is necessary and proper for the development of the capability; however, it does not appear necessary that the output of the new capability also be managed by the development agency. Proper safeguards can be established to permit wider exploitation of the product on a more timely basis than at present.

#### E. Tactical Intelligence

All of the intelligence effort discussed to this point is called "strategic" or "national" intelligence. It is the intelligence needed for planning and making decisions at the top levels of the Department of Defense as distinguished from "tactical" intelligence which is needed by the field commander for use in combat. In large part, the resources required to collect and process the raw intelligence information are identical for both strategic and tactical intelligence. However, "tactical" intelligence resources are not specifically identified as such in the programming process and are not reviewed or funded in an intelligence program.

The Military Departments, in fulfilling their responsibility to develop and support intelligence systems organic to combat forces, can develop a significant intelligence capability that is managed external to the intelligence community. For example, the Air Force 440L system was developed to provide early warning

of an impending attack against the United States, however, the sensor system has the capability to collect many other types of intelligence information, but the full capability is not exploited.

The DOD cannot afford to develop expensive resources exclusively for "strategic" or "tactical" intelligence purposes, nor to develop extensive duplicate resources for both. The development and operation of intelligence resources must be managed so that both types of requirements are satisfied at the minimum cost. The relative priorities of strategic and tactical needs tend to permit minimum costs with good management.

There is a continuum between peace and general war through which the priority needs for intelligence tend to shift from primarily strategic to primarily tactical. The same resources can be used to satisfy both needs by adjusting the application of resources to the changing priority.

In time of peace or cold war, the priority is for the most timely and accurate intelligence at the national (Washington) level to provide a basis for the best policy and guidance decisions. The field commander should want this to be the case to insure that policy decisions affecting the force structure he might have to fight with were the best. In this period of cold war, his principal intelligence need is continuity on strengths and positions of forces which might engage him if fighting erupts.

In time of limited warfare, a localized force commander must have the best intelligence to conduct his operations and the national level needs timely intelligence to formulate national policy, insure the fighting commander sufficient forces, and best deploy the remaining forces to meet other commitments.

In time of general war the priority is to provide the fighting force commander with the intelligence needed to prosecute the war; relatively less emphasis is placed on long-range policy decisions.

The intelligence resources integral to the combatant forces must be programmed, developed and operated as a part of the Defense intelligence community. At the same time, it is necessary to manage and operate these resources in a way that assures that commanders at all levels have appropriate access to intelligence information they need without regard to the location or control of the sensors.

## F. Compartmented Intelligence

There is a recognized need to limit access to extremely sensitive intelligence materials because their disclosure or even knowledge of their existence could cause the source to be denied, lives to be in peril, or political repercussions that could jeopardize a U.S. position. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

We now find technical information, collection and processing operations and product which contain information that is protected by more than one of the systems.

It is necessary, therefore, for the user to demonstrate a need-to-know and be authorized access under each of the compartmented areas which affect control of a particular document.

Investigative requirements and criteria for granting access to all compartmented areas under the cognizance of the DCI are formalized in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/14. However, access is actually granted by the manager of the compartmented system.

Since each of the major compartmented systems is managed by a different organization which jealously guards its prerogatives to control access to its information, many potential users have difficulty in determining that useful information is available and more difficulty in getting the multiple access required.

## Recommendations

The Panel recommends that the Defense intelligence community be restructured to provide a better management structure and to assure the provision of intelligence, as required, to the President, other consumers at the national level and to all levels of the Department from the Secretary of Defense to operating units in the field. The new intelligence structure should:

1. Function in response to consumer requirements for intelligence and provide timely and quality products, responsive to those requirements, with a proper balance between collection, processing, and production activities.
2. Provide a clear chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the collection and production units that will assure the timely flow of intelligence information and minimize the injection of bias arising from Service affiliations, or operational location.
3. Provide for a single individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who is the clearly designated representative of the Secretary of Defense to other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and who is responsible to coordinate or direct all intelligence activities within the Department.
4. Provide flexibility for timely development and distribution of limited, costly resources, both trained personnel and equipments, to meet changing priorities.
5. Provide the proper environment to develop an effective and efficient professional intelligence career service for both military and civilian personnel.

Specifically, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

\*\*\*\*\*

1. *Designate the Deputy Secretary for Operations to be his agent for all matters relating to intelligence, to include the authority to designate those activities to be considered intelligence activities.*

\*\*\*\*\*

2. Establish under the Deputy Secretary for Operations an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)) with the additional title of Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI). The ASD(I)/DDI would be delegated the responsibility to represent the Secretary of Defense with other Departments and Agencies of Government for Intelligence matters and to coordinate or direct all DOD intelligence activities, including national programs which are managed in the Department, in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Among his specific responsibilities, the ASD(I)/DDI would:

a. Serve as the Defense representative on the United States Intelligence Board, and appoint, with approval of the Deputy Secretary for Operations, representatives to other government-wide intelligence committees and boards.

b. Direct and control all DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces.

c. Have the authority to delegate operation of any of these activities which he deems necessary to assure maximum exploitation of DOD resources.

d. Review all proposed intelligence programs, monitor and evaluate all on-going intelligence activities and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for Operations with regard to allocation of resources.

e. Establish procedures to review and validate requirements for intelligence production and collection and evaluate the product against the requirement.

f. Establish procedures for and periodically conduct a systematic evaluation of the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. This evaluation should include an assessment of the utility of the intelligence products provided to consumers outside the Defense intelligence community.

g. Review and consolidate requirements for research and development in support of intelligence activities.

h. Develop policies and procedures to insure the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

3. Establish under the ASD(I)/DDI:

a. A Defense Security Command (DSECC) to be composed of the present Service Cryptologic Agencies and all other Defense intelligence collection activities except for those which have been specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces. The DSECC should perform those processing activities which are most efficiently associated with collection facilities. Among his specific responsibilities, the Commander, DSECC would, under the direction of the DDI:

(1) Command all those designated Defense intelligence collection and associated processing and reporting activities, with authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Serve as Director, National Security Agency.

(3) Insure the most judicious use of common staff elements between his DSECC and NSA.

(4) Insure the timely dissemination of intelligence information to all appropriate Departments, Agencies, Commands or operating units.

(5) Prepare the Defense Security Program for those activities for which he is responsible, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence collection activities organic to the combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

b. A Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), to replace the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose Director would be responsible for Defense Intelligence production except for those production activities specifically assigned to the combatant forces by the Deputy Secretary for Operations. Among his specific responsibilities, the Director, DIPA would:

(1) Direct those intelligence production activities which have been placed under his purview, with the authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Provide current intelligence to designated individuals and organizations.

(3) Provide threat assessments for all elements of DOD, as required.

(4) Provide finished intelligence to appropriate elements of the Department in response to expressed needs.

(5) Provide all DOD intelligence estimates and inputs to national estimates as directed by the DDI.

(6) Manage all Defense intelligence production information systems, including those of the intelligence activities organic to the combatant forces, to insure interoperability and optimized intelligence flow to and from all echelons of DOD.

(7) Prepare the Defense Intelligence Program for those activities under his direction, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence production activities organic to combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

4. Expand the responsibilities of the National Security Agency to include the processing, data base maintenance and reporting of all intelligence information as directed by the DDI.

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

5. Establish within the DSECC a unified Defense Investigative Service responsible for all personnel security investigations within the DOD and its contractors.

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

6. Combine the Army Topographic Command, the Naval Oceanographic Office and the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center into a unified Defense Map Service reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Management of Resources).

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

7. Take the actions necessary (a) to extend to the entire Defense intelligence community the authority that the National Security Agency presently has to develop a professional career service, and (b) to establish an intelligence career service for military officers.

\*\*\*\*\*